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Religious Tolerance through Humility: Thinking with Philip Quinn, edited 
by James kraft and David basinger. Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008. 
Pp. 138. $89.95
ANDY GUSTAFSON, Creighton University
The essays in this book revolve around the general issue of whether or not 
exposure to diverse religious viewpoints can and should lead to a humil-
ity which in turn can and should lead to more religious tolerance. A strong 
diverse lineup including essays by David basinger, william Lane Craig, 
keith Yandell, John Greco, william Hasker, James kraft, Peter byrne, rob-
ert Mckim, Jerome Gellman and the late Philip L. Quinn ensured that there 
would be both debate and thoughtful insight. Quinn thinks that in many 
instances, one’s reasons for one’s religious beliefs are generally no better 
than those of others who hold different competing religious beliefs, and 
that this epistemic realization leads to humility and can minimize intoler-
ant behavior. Certainly none of these authors agree with Quinn entirely, 
and most raise serious objections to the claim that religious diversity leads 
to epistemic humility or tolerance. 
Starting with the notion that the religious beliefs of others which 
conflict with our own can provide potential defeaters (in a Plantingian 
sense) to our own religious beliefs, Quinn’s initial excerpt essay brings 
to the foreground the philosophical question and personal existential 
struggle that many of us feel in the face of intelligent non-Christians’ 
authentic beliefs. 
Craig disagrees with Quinn’s claims that diversity provides substantial 
defeaters, and rejects the view that there is an epistemic standoff among 
world religions. Craig agrees with Plantinga that there are many cogent 
arguments for theism, and believes that there are substantial defeaters 
against non-theistic religions. Craig finds Quinn’s claim that religious tol-
erance can arise from religious uncertainty and moral conviction to be 
unconvincing because some religions undermine the possibility of moral 
conviction, according to Craig, and ultimately tolerance is to be found in 
the certainty of the intrinsic value of each God-created individual, not in 
religious uncertainty. 
basinger does not agree with Quinn that religious diversity as a phe-
nomenon produces epistemic humility, but he agrees with Quinn’s senti-
ments as he relies on his personal experiences as a teacher and academic 
to claim that people who do have a higher awareness of other faiths and 
interaction with those of other faiths tend to be more tolerant and humble. 
but it is not because they have come to doubt their own position in light of 
others’ beliefs. Again, uncertainty is not the cause of humility. 
Gellman provides a Jewish voice in the book and says that “Quinn’s 
strategy has a chance of advancing tolerance only in a society where toler-
ance is already a well-established social phenomenon and Quinn is trying 
only to get slackers to join in” (p. 50). Gellman’s basic criticism is that most 
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cases of dangerous religious intolerance arise in cultures with civil tradi-
tions which lack an understanding or respect for religious freedom. 
Greco’s essay is really about theism and atheism. He argues that reli-
gious belief is rational not so much because of argument but because of 
perceptions and testimony. The bottom line for this discussion of religious 
diversity and humility is that if perception and testimony are the real basis 
of rational religious belief, then multiple religious belief structures can be 
seen as rational, due to the different perceptions and testimonial commu-
nities from which such beliefs arise. 
kraft argues that Islam is not more violent than Christianity. kraft tends 
to agree with Quinn that awareness of religious diversity can lead to a loss 
of confidence which can lead to epistemic humility and tolerance. This 
loss of confidence is the price we must pay in order to have a safer world. 
Mckim grants Quinn and like-minded thinkers that “facing up to vari-
ous facts about other religious traditions probably often has a certain ton-
ing-down effect on people’s religious beliefs” but if people’s religious be-
liefs combat intolerance and help promote tolerance, then it doesn’t seem 
that undermining those religious beliefs would in fact lead to greater tol-
erance, but less (p. 76). Mckim also criticizes the notion of tolerance: “Tol-
erance is inadequate, given broad parity, because it is too begrudging, too 
lacking in generosity. It sees others as an annoyance, a burden to be borne, 
something to put up with, to live with and to endure, something in the 
face of which you choose to ‘grit your teeth and bear it’” (p. 82). Instead of 
tolerance, Mckim suggests a posture of ‘respectful curiosity.’
Hasker argues that Quinn’s development of thinner theologies along 
the lines of Alston in a kantian direction ala John Hick guts authentic re-
ligious belief to such an extent that they become ineffectual. Hasker sug-
gests, instead of this approach, a rawlsian overlapping consensus method 
where the various religious doctrines are drawn on to provide broad lib-
eral protections for difference. 
byrne suggests that while the problem of intolerance is likely the result 
of religious exclusivism, the solution to religious intolerance is not to be 
found in religious diversity or epistemic humility, but in political prioritiz-
ing of principles of liberty over the individual’s moral beliefs about what 
is right or wrong. (An example would be that we allow people to worship 
what others of us would consider false religions for the sake of liberty and 
religious freedom.) byrne raises the question of how a religious group 
which sees others as God-hated and damned for eternity can simultane-
ously respect and accept those who are seen as “the damned, traitors to 
God, or as vermin” (p. 108). He concludes that “Soteriological exclusivism 
thus appears to be the potential enemy of tolerance” and political liberal-
ism is our best defense against this danger (p. 109).
keith Yandell’s essay completes the book with a critique of Quinn, Al-
ston, and Hick, with conclusions similar to Hasker’s view that an atenuat-
ed, general religion is ineffectual and actually undermines the possibility 
of essential beliefs: “Thus no one can claim to ‘know God’, let alone know 
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that God became incarnate in Jesus Christ to die for our sins and be raised 
for our justification” (p. 122).
This book honors Quinn not through agreement or support of his views 
on religious humility and tolerance, but by seriously engaging his thought 
and these questions that he found to be important. The result is a good set 
of diverse essays which highlight many of the key issues and questions in 
the debate. No particular conclusion is reached here, but the relationships 
between humility and tolerance and religious diversity are explored fruit-
fully, and hopefully this book will lead to further work and discussion on 
this topic. It seems true that interaction with kind, thoughtful believers of 
other faiths can make us more sympathetic to other belief systems even if 
we do not agree with them. And it also seems clear that such sympathy 
with beliefs we disagree with is not due to loss of confidence in our own 
faith necessarily, but rather due to realizing the humanness of those be-
lievers and understanding why they might believe as they do. In short, 
humility which can come from awareness of religious diversity is not in 
any significant way connected to loss of an exclusivist faith position. 
Developmental Theism: From Pure Will to Unbounded Love by Peter Forrest. 
Clarendon Press, 2007. Pp. 199. $55 (cloth)
DANIeL DOMbrOwSkI, Seattle University
both the existence and the concept of God are examined in this thought-
provoking book. The author’s treatment of the existence of God is built 
foursquare on a philosophical anthropology. There is a spectrum of phil-
osophical positions regarding what human beings are: reductive mate-
rialism sees consciousness and agency (the mental) as redundant of the 
physical; moderate materialism sees the mental as nonredundant of the 
physical, but as nonetheless correlated with the physical in a metaphysi-
cally necessary fashion; moderate idealism sees the physical as nonre-
dundant of the mental, but as nonetheless correlated with the mental in a 
metaphysically necessary fashion; reductive idealism sees the physical as 
redundant of the mental; and, of course, dualism sees the mental and the 
physical as correlated only contingently.
Forrest thinks that the probability of theism is negligible only if we are 
almost certain of reductive materialism. That is, we have good reason to 
be theists. But the author does not so much think that we should be confi-
dent theists as that we should not be confident atheists. 
Among the options in philosophical anthropology listed in the first 
paragraph, it is moderate materialism that Forrest defends, a position that 
coheres with theism better than its chief rival, dualism. Because of the cur-
rent dominance of materialism in philosophy, he thinks that philosophical 
theists should pay attention to a type of theism that is built on a moderate 
